with "sudden stops", for which variables such as external borrowing denominated in foreign currency takes center stage, while for advanced economies housing booms and household leverage take on importance. Claessens, Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2010) examine the evidence for the recent financial crisis.
The distinction between emerging and advanced economies is also reflected in the work of the official sector. The IMF has added a new Vulnerability Exercise for Advanced Economies (VEA) to an existing Vulnerability Exercise for Emerging Economies (VEE), which both feed into joint early warning exercise with the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
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Although the compartmentalization into emerging and advanced economies helps in improving the goodness of fit, it tends to obscure the common threads that tie together emerging and advanced economy crises. The capital flow reversals in Spain and Ireland in the European crisis have many of the features of a "sudden stop", except that the outflow of private sector funds has been compensated by the inflow of official funds. 3 However, since the Eurozone crisis is taking place within a common currency area, the traditional classification of emerging market "currency crises" where currency movements play a key role do not necessarily fit easily in the empirical exercise.
Given the common threads that tie together apparently disparate crises, it can be useful to take a step back from the practical imperatives of maximizing goodness of fit and instead consider the conceptual underpinnings of early warning models. This is the purpose of my paper.
In what follows, I will suggest that the procyclicality of the financial system provides an organizing framework for selecting indicators of vulnerability to crises, especially those that are associated with banks and financial intermediaries more generally.
More specifically, we examine three broad sets of indicators for early warning purposes, and assess their relative likelihood of success. The three sets of indicators are:
 Indicators based on market prices, such as CDS spreads, implied volatility and other price-based measures of default or distress  Gap measures of the credit to GDP ratio  Banking sector liability aggregates, including monetary aggregates To anticipate my conclusions, the first approach (based on market prices) seems most appropriate for obtaining indicators of concurrent market conditions but unlikely to be useful as early warning indicators with enough time for meaningful remedial action.
The credit to GDP gap measure is a distinct improvement from the first as an early warning indicator, with a good pedigree from the work of BIS economists and has been explored extensively as part of the Basel III bank capital rules. Yet, there are doubts about its usefulness as a real time measure, or as a measure that yields a threshold that can be applied uniformly across countries.
That leaves the third approach -one based on bank liability aggregates, including various components of the money stock. I will suggest that this third approach is the most promising, as it preserves the advantages of the credit to GDP gap measure but also stands a good chance of yielding indicators that can be used in real time.
The downside, however, of the monetary approach is that any measure derived in this way will need to find meaning by appeal to specific institutional features of the financial system, rather than being applied in an unthinking way.
In addition, we will find that we need to transcend traditional thinking behind the definitions of monetary aggregates in order to make the approach useful. Whereas traditional definitions of monetary aggregates exclude the liabilities between financial intermediaries when defining monetary aggregates, such liability aggregates turn out to be perhaps the most informative of them all. Figure 1 gives the CDS spreads of Bears Stearns and Lehman Brothers, with the right hand panel giving the longer perspective and illustrating how the spreads increase sharply with the onset of the crisis. Some of the forces toward procyclicality were described in my Mundell-Fleming lecture last year (Shin (2012) ). As an illustration of the outcome of such a tendency toward procyclicality, the scatter chart in Figure 2 plots how much the change in the balance sheet size of Barclays -a typical global bank -is financed through equity and how much through debt. It also shows how much risk-weighted assets change as the balance sheet grows or shrinks.
Price-based Early Warning Indicators
The fact that risk-weighted assets barely increase in Figure 2 even as raw assets are increasing rapidly is indicative of the lowering of measured risks (such as spreads or
Value-at-Risk measures) during lending booms. Lower measured risks and lending booms thus go together. The causation in the reverse direction will also have been operating -the compression of risk spreads is induced by the rapid increase in credit supply chasing available credits. Such two-way causation lays the ground for a feedback loop in which greater credit supply and the compression of spreads feed off each other.
The procyclicality evident in Figure 2 poses hard challenges for traditional thinking that places faith in "market discipline" as an integral part of financial regulation, where prices are relied upon to issue timely warning signals. Indeed, "Market Discipline" was granted the status of one of the three "Pillars" of the Basel II framework for international bank regulation. Economists associated with the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee were influential in this regard. Calomiris (1999) argued for rules requiring banks to maintain a minimum amount of subordinated debt, with the rationale being that banks that take on excessive risk will find it difficult to sell their subordinated debts, and will be forced to shrink their risky assets or to issue new equity to comply with the discipline imposed by private uninsured creditors. However, the experience in the run-up to the recent crisis showed how market risk premiums erode so as to nullify market discipline. Larry Summers's quip (Summers (1985) ) that the achievement of finance researchers is to show that "two quart bottles of ketchup invariably sell for twice as much as one quart bottles of ketchup" is related to why price-based measures of early warning indicators are likely to fail. Absence of arbitrage means that prices at a point in time are consistent, but they are liable to flip to distress mode (again, fully consistently across assets) with the onset of the crisis. If the task is to give prior warning of the onset of the crisis, pricebased measures have little to say about the transition.
Since the onset of crisis is often accompanied by run-like events, the switch from a benign environment to a hostile one can be precipitous. The global games literature illustrates how the transition into financial distress -the "tipping point" -is associated with self-reinforcing effects between individual constraints and market outcomes, but how the onset of the crisis is triggered by apparently small changes in the underlying fundamentals. Outwardly, the switch has the flavor of a self-fulfilling crisis. Goldstein (2010) discusses how empirical research should take account of such tipping points, and shows how the global games framework (Morris and Shin (1998 , 2000 ) can be usefully invoked in the modeling exercise.
To the extent that market prices have been useful for early warning exercises at all, their usefulness comes precisely when the market price of risk is too low, rather than too high.
Thus, it is when asset prices are too high relative to some benchmark that warnings signs are appropriate.
In their 2005 paper on the US housing market, Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) argued that a high price-to-rent ratio or high price-to-income ratio need not be indicators of a housing bubble as discount rates implied by low long-term interest rates had also fallen. But since discount rates are prices, the combination of low discount rates and high housing prices is arguably the kind of point-in-time consistency in prices that Summers (1985) had in mind.
Credit to GDP gap indicators
Under the Basel III framework, the ratio of credit to GDP takes a central role as the basis for the countercyclical capital buffer. This ratio has been shown to be useful as an indicator of the stage of the financial cycle, notably by Lowe (2002, 2004) . To the extent that procyclicality drives financial vulnerability, detecting excessive credit growth is central. Normalizing credit to some underlying flow fundamental measure such as GDP and detecting deviations from trend would be one way to operationalize the notion of excessive credit growth.
However, although a credit boom is clear with hindsight, there are several challenges to using the deviation of the credit to GDP ratio from trend as an early warning indicator in real time.
The first is the difficulty of estimating the trend that serves as the benchmark for what is "excessive" growth. The difficulty is not unique to the credit to GDP ratio, but one shared by other macroeconomic time series. Edge and Meisenzahl (2011) find that expost revisions to the credit-to-GDP ratio gap in real time are sizable for the U.S. and as large as the gap itself. The source of the ex post revisions is not the revision of the underlying data, but rather from the revision of the estimated trend measured in real time.
The second difficulty is that credit growth and GDP dance to somewhat different tunes over the cycle, so that the ratio of the two may sometimes issue misleading signals. Bank lending in particular may be influenced by pre-existing contractual commitments, such as lines of credit, which are drawn down during the crisis. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) document the impact of such lines of credit on credit growth during the recent crisis.
Therefore, lending may continue to increase for some time after the onset of the crisis. From the right hand panel of Figure 3 , we note that the gap measure is large even as GDP growth is falling very sharply during the crisis. Thus, the ratio of the two gives a misleadingly large credit to GDP ratio during the crisis.
Basel III discussions have given a great deal of prominence to the credit-to-GDP gap measure (BCBS (2009 (BCBS ( , 2010 ). To the extent that the Basel rules are expected to be applied uniformly (or at least, in a consistent manner), finding common thresholds for the credit to GDP ratio would be a basic requirement for Basel III to apply uniformly to all Basel Committee member countries.
Bank liability aggregates, including some monetary aggregates
Rapid growth of bank lending is mirrored on the liabilities side of the balance sheet by shifts in the composition of bank funding. As intermediaries who borrow in order to lend, banks must raise funding in order to lend to their borrowers. When credit is growing faster than the available pool of funds that are usually drawn on by the bank ("core liabilities"), the bank will turn to other, "non-core" sources of funding to support its credit growth.
In this way, the ratio of non-core to core liabilities serves as a signal of the degree of risktaking by the bank and hence of the stage of the financial cycle. Hahm, Shin and Shin (2011) conduct a cross-country panel probit study and find that the ratio of non-core to core liabilities (especially the non-core liabilities to foreign creditors) emerges consistently the most robust predictor of a currency crisis or credit crisis. Indeed, rather than speaking of the demand for money by savers, we could turn the relationship on its head, and speak of the supply of funding by savers.
Similarly, by speaking of the supply of money as the demand for funding, the shift in the language serves to focus attention on the banking sector and its balance sheet management over the cycle.
However, monetary aggregates are traditionally measured by netting out claims between banks. For financial stability purposes, however, the claims between banks -especially when they are cross-border -take on great significance. 
Core and Non-Core Liabilities in China
However, what counts as "core" or "non-core" will depend on the financial system and the institutions. The procyclical pattern in corporate deposits in the right hand panel in Figure 3 may be due to such activities of non-financial corporates.
In addition, such activities of non-financial corporates may also explain why China has been experiencing dollar shortages in recent weeks with the deterioration of global funding markets due to the crisis in Europe. During this period the RMB has been under pressure, depreciating against the US dollar.
Although China's banking system is largely closed, the global activities of its nonfinancial firms will be reflected in the corporate deposits within M2 when those firms hold the proceeds of dollar liabilities in their accounts in China. The excess liquidity generated by the activity of non-financial corporates in China will be an important element of the lending boom in China, and is reminiscent of the lending boom in Japan in the 1980s following financial liberalization that allowed Japanese companies to access global capital markets.
Both in Japan in the 1980s and in China more recently, monetary aggregates, especially corporate deposits played the role of non-core liabilities in the way that FX borrowing by Korean banks plays the role of non-core liabilities in Korea.
The point of contact between the FX liabilities in Korea and the corporate deposits in China is that both are liability components of banks. Provided we have the correct demarcation between core and non-core liabilities, we can apply the same method of tracking the ratio of non-core to core liabilities as an indicator that can serve as early warning indicators of financial vulnerability.
